Moral character is formed by one's actions. The habits, actions, and emotional responses of the person of good character all are united and directed toward the moral and the good. Because human beings are body/soul unities, actions of the body are actions of the self, that is, human beings are self-possessing, self-governing, and self-determining. In order to be of good character, one must know the good, act in morally good ways, and be disposed and inclined toward the good through the development of virtues. Character and action are intertwined so intimately that one's professional duties, or even what is perceived by others as one's duties, cannot override one's conscience without negatively affecting (and changing) one's character. For the physician to be of good character, it is vital that he or she follow his or her conscience in all things: in private life and also in his or her profession, i.e., in the treatment of patients.
think are wrong (and even evil). 2 Can one's professional duties override one's conscience? 3 Is such a conflict even possible? There are many variations of these positions, and some even seek a middle ground between them. The issue is becoming more and more urgent as many US states consider rejecting existing laws that allow conscientious objection or enacting laws specifically to allow it.
What seems even more insidious, and more crucial, is the claim of some physicians that they can involve themselves with these things in their public life and still be against them privately. They insist that they can compartmentalize their life in such a way that the two do not affect one another. It could be that they do not consider contraceptives to be abortifacient, and so, there is no moral problem with prescribing them, or that they should not push their Catholic beliefs on non-Catholic patients or other reasons. "If women who come into my practice ask for contraception, as is the culture in our society today, I prescribe it. That's what I do. I'm trained to be an ob-gyn," said Lester Ruppersberger, D.O., who later stopped prescribing contraceptives (Schierhorn 2013; see also Brinker 2010 and Grisez 1997) . Mary Davenport, M.D., explains what happened when she first joined the American Association of Pro-Life Obstetricians and Gynecologists (AAPLOG): I asked if one could prescribe IUDs, oral contraceptives, and post-coital contraception and be a member of the organization. I was told that organization existed to fight surgical and medical abortion of established pregnancies, and that the IUDs and hormonal [contraception] didn't violate that principal … . This didn't make sense to me, but I figured if the distinguished physicians who started this organization at the time of Roe v. Wade could live with that contradiction, I could too. I later found out that many AAPLOG doctors actually do not believe that oral contraceptives act as abortifacients, which was a complete surprise to me! (Davenport 1998, 23) This paper will examine the relationship between one's actions and one's character. When one is pressured or convinced or even willing to perform an action that one considers to be bad or wrong, does it corrupt one's (good) character or can one maintain a separation of character from action? Does one's character regulate one's actions or generate a specific or required set of actions? These seem to be key issues in discussions of conscience, conscientious objection, and character.
CHARACTER
Paul Ricoeur describes character as something, which cannot be separated from the person (Ricoeur 1992, 122) . It has "a permanence which we say belongs to us" (Ricoeur 1992, 118 ). Ricoeur defines "character" as "the set of distinctive marks which permit the re-identification of a human individual as being the same." 4 We cannot separate character from the person and say here is the person and there is his or her character. A person can be distinguished from his or her actions, what was done is different from who did it. But the same distinction cannot be made between character and action. But Ricoeur's discussion of character seems to include much more than moral character as can be seen from the following statement:
By means of this stability, borrowed from acquired habits and identifications-in other words, from dispositions-character assures at once numerical identity, qualitative identity, uninterrupted continuity across change, and, finally, permanence in time which defines sameness. (Ricoeur 1992, 122) "Personality" might be a more comprehensive term for such a broad definition than "character" (Audi 1991, 307) . This broader category can then include nature or traits, about which one could turn to biology for explanations (Ricoeur 1992 , 120 note 5); and position or capacity or reputation, which is the expertise of sociology or the like; and many other aspects of the person.
The rational side, including "moral excellence and firmness," can more easily be found under the term "moral character." 5 From this moral aspect come evaluation, judgment, decision, choice resulting in right or wrong, and moral or immoral action. 6 It is this last aspectmoral character-which is most involved in a physician's moral decisions. Character then involves goodness and wickedness, that is, ethics. In this case, one must turn to philosophy (and anthropology), and especially the study of ethics, for assistance and understanding.
A more detailed definition of character, or, more specifically, being of good character, can be found in the three facets of dispositions, desires, and tendencies: having steady and permanent dispositions to do what is right and to refrain from doing what is wrong; having morally desirable wishes, desires, purposes, and goals; and having the tendency to respond emotionally toward things in the morally appropriate way. 7 The habits, actions, and emotional responses of the person of good character all are united and directed toward the moral and the good.
Aristotle's famous four categories of character (the virtuous, the continent, the incontinent, and the vice-filled 8 ) in the Nicomachean Ethics reflect aspects of this deeper definition. 9 In the vice-filled person, reason and appetite are united; and reason is a slave to passions and appetites. The vice-filled person chooses what his or her appetites command. In the incontinent person, reason and appetite are not united; and appetite wins out more often than reason. There is correct knowledge of the right thing to do and desire to do it, to be a virtuous person, but one fails more than one wins; and appetite overrides reason. In the continent person, reason and appetite are not united; but reason wins out more often than appetite. The desire is there; and the right thing gets done more frequently than not. In the virtuous person, reason and appetite are united; and appetite is controlled by reason so the right thing gets done (most of the time). In addition, these categories admit of degrees; one person may be more continent or less incontinent. Also, persons are not static; they (usually) move within a category or between categories during the course of their lifetime. Most persons fall into the categories of continent and incontinent; they know the good and are more or less able to do it.
The physician who writes a prescription for contraceptives knowing that it is wrong may fall into the category of the incontinent. 10 For example, he may be under pressure from his colleagues or society and be acting out of fear or timidity. Or he may think he is acting for a greater good-an obligation to his patient to provide what is requested. This second case does not seem to quite fit into Aristotle's categories as the physician seems to be choosing the good (fulfilling the requests of his patients) and overriding his emotions (toward contraception). Reason seems to be in control of appetites and passions. The problem here is not that appetite is controlling reason, but that reason is faulty. The knowledge of the good is not lacking in one respect-the evil of contraception is recognized-but is lacking in another, the knowledge of the relationship between character and action is insufficient resulting in bad choices. Here then is another facet of character: one must have right reason or, more specifically, a rightly formed reason-that is, not just knowledge of the good but correct knowledge of the good, in this case, correct knowledge of the human person, a sufficient anthropology, if you will. 11 The physician also needs correct knowledge of the ends of medicine (more on this later). This is why truth is so important for character (and human action, and moral decision making).
One's character is based upon the truth (as one knows it). That the truth about something (and about everything) makes a difference can be seen in terms such as "dirty money." It makes a difference to a person of good character where money they have received as a gift comes from. Donations are usually accepted at face value, but when the truth about the source of the money is revealed, another determination is made about its acceptability. A donation of hard-earned money from honest work is seen as acceptable; while a donation from stolen funds or money made from illegal drug trade or other illegal activities would be refused. "Dirty" money is seen as tainting the character even of one who simply receives it as a gift.
It is a trait of human beings, not nonhuman animals, that they need right reason in order to become fully human beings. It is a trait of human beings, not spirits, that they are in the process of change, of becoming what they are. Edith Stein makes this clear.
The human soul must gradually gain possession of its essence or nature, and its life is the way that leads to that goal. This is why in the case of the human soul formation is possible and necessary. But so that this formation may be free, … the human soul must have self-knowledge and be capable of taking a stand with respect to its own self. It must find itself in a dual sense: It must learn to know itself, and it must come to be what it is destined to be. 12 Therefore, the more one knows the truth about reality, the world, the human being, the better able one is to form a good character. A consequence of this is that the one who thinks he knows the good is harder to correct than the one who is incontinent yet has right reasoning, "because reasoning does not teach the principles" (Aquinas 1993 (Aquinas , bk. 7, lec. 8, n. 1432 . The incontinent person knows he is doing something wrong, and wants to and tries to change. The person who thinks he is doing something right when he is not is hard to convince, because he thinks he is right. In other words, he thinks he has the truth. 13 In both cases described above, the physician may think he or she can perform a bad act yet stay of good character. As a physician, he or she writes prescriptions for contraception, but in his or her private life, he or she thinks use of contraception is immoral. This belief-ultimately about the separation of character and action-is the reasoning for continuing the behavior (writing prescriptions for contraception). If this belief is true, then these physicians are upholding good character (at least in this area). If it is false, then they are changing their character. However, any truth found may not lead the physicians in this example to change: the one may still be unable to overcome passions, and the other may then become obstinate (Aquinas 1993, bk . 7)-but on the other hand, truth is an essential component of good character and a better understanding may lead to better reasoning and improved moral character.
Can character be compartmentalized either so that it is unaffected by certain actions or that one has more than one character (say a character in one's role as physician and a different character in one's private life)? Fundamental to answering these questions is the relationship of character to the person, the amount of control over character development a person has, and the effects of one's actions on character.
Sign A United States flag is a sign. It conveys more meaning than a rectangle of the colors red, white, and blue, and stars and stripes. It stands for honor and courage, blood shed in battles, freedom, the unity of fifty states, and more. A traffic light indicates more than three circles of red, amber, and green lights. It controls actions of cars and pedestrians, makes busy intersections safe, and allows people moving in opposing and conflicting directions to progress safely.
In the same manner, the character of a human being means more than "this is a human being"; it also indicates what manner of human being this is (good or evil, virtuous or vice-filled, saint or beast, etc.). Being of good character is not a description of the uniqueness of Joe in the same way that physical indicators, such as fingerprints or DNA, are, but Joe does have a unique character in that it is a unique mixture of strengths, weaknesses, virtues, vices, knowledge, and experience.
While a sign, such as a flag or a traffic light, expresses its meaning through its physical presence, a human being expresses character through actions. I cannot determine Joe's character through watching him stand in one spot (unless that spot is atop a pole in the desert like the desert Fathers) or through his physical description. To find out about his character, I must observe Joe's actions. Does he kick the cat or pet it? Does he give a coin to the beggar or turn his face away? It is not even any one action that resolves the issue, but the accumulation of all my observations and interactions with the person, which reveals his or her character. But even then, I cannot know Joe's character fully. One action can cause one to re-evaluate the whole of a person's character, just as a single pebble can cause ripples across much of a small pond. A multitude of good actions can confirm the good character of a person, but one bad action leads the observer to question that good character. 14 Maybe the person is of less good character than one thought, or maybe in this particular area, the person has a weakness 15 (The same can be said of someone who is vice-filled but does something truly charitable; maybe they are less bad then at first seems.) Even further, because human beings change over time, character cannot really be fully known until after changes stop (at death). And one can hardly know one's own character without some external input (Crosby 1996, 152-57) . This does not mean that character is completely unknowable. Character does express itself through actions. Others help us by reflecting back to us what our actions are telling them about our character. If we know Joe well enough, we can generally predict his actions. This is why one bad action from an otherwise good character mostly seems to come as a shock to those who are familiar with the person.
It also seems that we are better able to know another's character when the other person is closer to the virtuous or vice-filled ends of the spectrum. The more one's moral character tends toward one end of the spectrum (good or bad), the less unique it becomes but the more rare. Good character is an ideal outside of oneself that all strive for. In Christianity, the ideal is Christ; we are to constantly strive to be Christ-like, having the character of Christ. 16 The human being's "salvation, his perfect realization, will be accomplished when he is fully conformed to the risen, glorified Christ … . Revelation has as its end this perfect assimilation to Christ" (Caffara 1987, 170) . At the extremes of moral character, uniqueness is found more in personality, rather than in character. All the saints have similar characters, and all the beastly humans have similar characters. The virtue of prudence (or fortitude or temperance or justice, etc.) is the same in all who possess it though it may express itself differently depending on circumstances and personalities. We recognize Joe as different from Jane or Peter, but we recognize patience as being the same virtue in Joe and in Jane and in Peter.
Formation
Another facet of character is that it is able to be changed. Sometimes a child who was a "little angel" (or "little devil") when young is the opposite as an adult. One reason criminals are imprisoned is to give them a chance to reform. One of the big issues in the education of children recently, especially in the US in light of school shootings such as Columbine, is character formation. 17 Even traits acquired whether through DNA or environment seem to be redirectable or even reversible. Shyness can sometimes be (more or less) overcome through training and practice in social or group settings. Aggressiveness can be directed toward useful or good purposes rather than bad or criminal ones. Anecdotal evidence for the changeability of character abounds. It is generally observable that character is subject to change over time, whether the change is small or a complete reversal.
Aristotle, in a more philosophical examination of character and the human being, found three things in the soul: passions (appetite and emotions), faculties (the capability to experience passions), and states of character (being well-or ill-disposed to each passion, the best state being moderation between extremes, for example, feeling anger moderately rather than too weakly or too violently) (Aristotle n.d., bk. 2, chap. 5). Aquinas took these up interpreting them as passion (passio), power (potentia), and habit (habitus). He then analyzed in which of these three character resides. Character is not a passion because passions come and go but character is indelible. Character is not a habit because a bad habit cannot be good nor a good habit bad, but character can be good or bad, in other words, it is indifferent to goodness and badness. Therefore, character must be a power, a potentia. 18 Here then is the root of the mutability of character, namely, a power is an ability or potential for change of some sort. There is movement from potential to actual, from power to action.
Ricoeur sees this power of character as a disposition acquired over time (Ricoeur 1992, 120-21) . This disposition is both immutable and mutable, stable and changeable. The source of these two seemingly incompatible traits is habit, that is, one is continually forming habits (mutability) and making use of already realized habits (a type of immutability). This last is what Ricoeur refers to as "sedimentation": that "which confers on character [a] sort of permanence in time" (Ricoeur 1992, 121) . Therefore, through the acquiring and the breaking of habits, character is formed and formable. 19 Once a physician starts writing prescriptions for contraception when a patient asks and no longer thinks about it overmuch but just does it, then this becomes a habit and consequently becomes part of his or her character. This does not mean that only habits form character. Rather, character is something incomplete in a sense. It develops over time. Dispositions, inclinations, and desires, which stabilize over time, are also part of the formation of character.
ACTION
The other side of the relation between moral character and action is the effect of action on character. Three aspects of action relevant to this are repetition of action and its effect on the person, the type of action, and intention and responsibility.
Habits, skills, and habitus
Actions can be repetitive or automatic in (at least) three different ways: by habit, by education, and by habitus. When an action is constantly repeated, over time it can become a habit. Every time I see the straggly haired man in the orange beanie and three sweaters, I give him a dollar; the orange caught my eye at some time in the past, and ever since then, I respond with a dollar. Or I habitually put my keys on the bookshelf by the front door. The action gradually becomes unconscious or automatic, and the will is less involved in the initiation of the action. Consequently, a habit takes away some freedom (Aquinas 1993 (Aquinas , bk. 7, lec. 6, n. 1403 . I am no longer as free to do something different. I can change my habit, but it usually requires continual, conscious effort and much struggle (until a new habit is established). I put the keys on the bookshelf again when I really wanted to put them on the new hook by the door, so I take them off the shelf and put them on the hook. Eventually, I will remember to put them on the hook instead of the bookshelf, and that will then become a new habit. The physician who automatically writes a prescription for contraception for patients who ask and no longer thinks it through has acquired a habit. The physician who automatically says no to such a request also has acquired a habit.
Another type of automatic action is a skill. Actions become skills through repetition and experience. The ruggedterrain hiker automatically reaches a hand out to steady the inexperienced hiker who is losing his or her balance on the steep path. The potter's hands automatically smooth out the small bumps in the clay pot he or she is making. The baker automatically stops kneading the bread dough when it reaches a certain elasticity. These actions are done without consciously thinking through all the steps and reasoning and judgments. These actions are skills.
Physical education thus means much more than merely bodily hygiene, physical exercise, or physical habituation. It means directing the will to a planful, conscientious, and free forming of the body. And such a free forming is possible because of the fact that the soul is the form of the body, so that the soul's attitude expresses itself naturally in the body. (Stein 2002, 428-29, original emphasis) One trains one's body through experience and repetition in how to act and react in a certain environment or under certain circumstances. This functions as a kind of physical memory, a memory in the body. These are skills.
A third way actions become automatic is through what Aquinas calls habitus, that is, inclination or disposition. I may give a dollar to the man in the orange beanie every time I see him, and that is a habit. But if every time I see someone begging, I give them a dollar; and I regularly give my restaurant leftovers to a homeless person; and I see a person without a coat shivering in the middle of winter and give them my coat, and on and on, example after example, that is a habitus, an inclination, a will-ingness, to respond charitably to anyone in need as the situation arises. The will has been trained to recognize the situation when it arises and to be willing to act in a charitable way. Rather than a habit as a type of muscle memory (always putting my keys on the bookshelf), the repeated actions of a specific kind (e.g., charitable) in different situations become a disposition to act in a specific way in all situations, in this case, in a charitable way. With habitus, one becomes a charitable person rather than a person with a habit. The source of this last type of action is character. In order for the physician to write a prescription for contraception (or not) out of a habitus rather than a habit, he or she needs to act out of the detailed definition of character discussed at the beginning of this paper: desires, inclinations, tendencies, knowledge, and virtue.
While this example is about charity, there is nothing about habitus that requires it to be good. One may also will to be miserly and act in a miserly way and therefore develop a bad disposition or habitus of miserliness. The morality of the action also determines the morality of the habitus. But not all acts can be cataloged as moral or immoral. There are different types or categories of actions.
Moral action
Because human beings are body/soul unities, actions of the body are actions of the self. "As an instrument of my acts, my body is an integral part of the unity of my personality" (Stein 2002, 367) . Even the biological functions of the body are (or can be) part of the self. When my stomach growls, I do not say "my body is hungry" but "I am hungry." I do not say "my body has a fever," but "I have a fever." Digestion of food is certainly an action, as is jumping when startled or yawning when tired. Aquinas calls these acts of a human being (actus humanus) and distinguishes them from human acts (actus humanis). Human acts are rational acts, "those springing from man's will following the order of reason" (Aquinas 1993, bk 1, lec. 1, n. 3) those "of which man is master … through his reason and will." 20 Consequently, they are moral acts. Human acts are more closely associated with character than are acts of human beings, because the former actions come from the whole person. They are a commitment of the whole person 21 ; the body did what the will willed. In other words, the person threw the whole of themselves, as a psycho-somatic unity, into the action. The person could have chosen to do something different, but chose this particular action.
In contrast, an act of a human is not a matter of choice. A person cannot choose to stop the physical act of their stomach growling. A growling stomach is not a choice. One can choose to eat something and thereby stop the growling but cannot choose to stop the growling directly by willing it. Even laughing at funny things is a moral act, in contrast to laughing because one is being tickled, which is an act of a human being. In the former, there is choice. One can choose to laugh or not. Laughing that is ridicule is a bad moral act. Laughing at oneself can be good (e.g., humbling). In fact, training oneself to not laugh at racist jokes or sexual innuendos is considered by many to be a moral responsibility. 22 Writing a prescription, likewise, is a human, and therefore moral, act; it is a matter of choice. One can write it or not write it as one wills and chooses. In Karol Wojtyla's thought, this sort of "action draws together all of the elements in the experience of the person." 23 And so, "action reveals the person." 24
Responsibility and intention
Two important aspects of the revelatory nature of action are responsibility and intention. To ask who did a specific action is to ask who is responsible, and to say that "Joe did it" is to assign responsibility to Joe for his actions. In other words, human beings own their actions and the consequences of them. This even applies to actions that are accidental rather than willed and chosen. If I unintentionally bump into someone while walking on a crowded sidewalk, the person I bumped into does not stop to ask if I did it on purpose but instead automatically expects an apology, and I automatically (hopefully) give it.
This intimacy between an action and the person who performs it is also recognized when a "why" is added to the "who did it." And while an external observer can see who did an action, the why is more intimate and internal to the agent. In nonhuman animals, the why is instinct and nature, in human acts of human beings, it is a combination of will, freedom, and choice. The will is the rational power of human beings to act. It is the ability to choose what is good (or what one thinks is good) directed by reason. 25 In the will, then, is found intention. Voluntary actions have their source in intention while involuntary actions, such as being startled, do not. 26 There are forward-looking motives or intentions, such as "to heal"; backward-looking motives or reasons, such as fear of ridicule or loss of job or loss of reputation; and motives-in-general, such as love of God or wanting to do the right thing. The incontinent physician mentioned above is writing the prescription out of a backward-looking motive, fear. The continent (or continent-like) physician is writing the prescription out of a forward-looking motive, health of the patient. Both are acting for a good end (keeping job or reputation, and health of patient). But both are acting out of a limited freedom. The former's freedom is limited by fear, the latter's by ignorance or obstinacy. Most importantly, the actions of both are coming from what is internal and inseparable from them, the will (John Paul II 1993, n. 67) .
Responsibility and intention are rooted in the will, which is the source of the selfpossession and self-governance of human beings. Self-possession is different from possession of an object. One can own or hold an object, such as a rock, and therefore have possession of it. But one owns and holds oneself internally in a way one cannot with a rock. We are conscious of the rock as something that is external, but we are conscious of ourselves from the inside. We are both the object of our consciousness and the subject. 27 As such, we have possession of ourselves in a more intimate way than we have possession of a rock.
Human beings are what they possess; they possess what they themselves are. Even under duress, a person is selfpossessing. One can be stopped from doing something through external sources such as obstacles put in one's way or even physical restraint, but no one can be forced to do something. The interesting thing here is that a physician may feel forced to write prescriptions for contraception through fear of ostracism or losing his job, but at the point at which he actually writes the prescription, he is no longer forced but actually willing the writing of the prescription. One can be prevented from doing something by external forces, but carrying through with an action has an element of the voluntary, of willing to do it and therefore cannot be forced. 28 Another way the will can be hindered is by lack of knowledge. 29 One may attempt to drive across a flooded bridge thinking the water is low enough to get through but then get stuck, because it was really two feet above the bridge. But if one knows that the water is that high, one would not drive across it or will to drive across it, because one knows the car will stall in the middle. In other words, while the will cannot be forced to will something, it can be hindered from doing what is willed (Aquinas 1948, I-II, q. 6, a. 4) .
A corollary of self-possession is selfgovernance. Self-governance includes selfcontrol but is farther and wider reaching into the interior of the self (Wojtyla 1979, 107) . It is not mere control, but rule, which includes control and more. The human being is self-governing in that he can carry out a human action or not carry it out as he wills. He can choose to write a prescription or chose not to write it. Because of selfpossession and self-governance, human beings both intend their actions and have responsibility for their actions.
INTEGRATION
Along with self-possession and selfgovernance, comes self-determination. To say that one's actions have no effect on one's character is a form of Cartesian dualism in which the mind controls the body as it would a machine. In this case, the body has no effect on the mind or the person; and one's character is only what one makes of it. The person is selfdirected and formed in an internal process isolated from external events and influences. 30 Paul Ricoeur seems to lend support to this view when he says that one can separate an action from an agent, but cannot separate character from agent. For character, what I am and who I am are the same: "Character is truly the 'what' of the 'who'" (Ricoeur 1992, 122) . The what is internal to the who. Whereas, for action, they are separable; we can isolate the what, writing a prescription, from the who, the physician. The what is external to the who. One can "distinguish between what someone does and the one who does something" (Ricoeur 1992, 122) .
Certainly, it is true that the who can be distinguished from the what, but they cannot really be separated from each other. A particular person did this specific action. If one changes perspective, from an external examination of the action performed and the person performing, to an internal examination of the person performing this action, then one can see that while there is distinction there is not separation. The person is the source and cause of his or her own actions.
All voluntary action upon the body, however, and all formative influence which the I-through the instrumentality of the body-exerts upon the external world rest upon the fact that human freedom is not restricted to the purely spiritual realm and that the realm of the spirit is not a separate, isolated sphere. The foundation upon which the spiritual life and free acts arise and to which they remain attached is the matter which is placed at the disposal of the human being's intellect and free will to be illuminated, formed, and used. In this way the bodily sentient life of the human being becomes a personally formed life and a constituent part of the human person. (Ricoeur 1992, 372-73) Ricoeur's separation of an agent from an act is a separation only externally and on the surface. Internally the agent, possessing will, self-governing, and self-possessing, is the direct cause of his or her action and therefore inseparable from it. Therefore, whichever choice is made (to write a prescription or not), the action is an expression of one's character and also reinforces or changes one's character, i.e., human beings are self-determining.
When a person recognizes a habit in himself as bad (e.g., smoking or biting one's nails), he or she usually seeks to change it. We recognize when someone is acting out of character. Our character allows others to predict, in a way, the types of actions we will do. We do not expect Mother Teresa of Calcutta to throw a sick person into the gutter, such an action would be out of character for her, rather we expect her to pick up a person out of the gutter. Being of good character means that some actions are excluded, but also that some are included and expected. We expect to perceive the virtues being expressed in the actions of one of good character. At the same time, one of good character tries to increase the virtues in oneself. Actions are expressive of character precisely because human beings are self-possessing, self-governing, and self-determining.
Acts which are "deliberate and chosen are essentially self-determining-that is, internal to and constitutive of an individual's character." 31 A simple way in which this happens is when a bad (or good) action becomes a habit. That habit then becomes part of one's character. As previously noted, Ricoeur called this sedimentation, a permanence acquired over time that therefore is seen as expressive of one's character (Ricoeur 1992, 121) .
Another way in which action becomes character is through inclinations or virtues. Recall the difference noted above between the habit of giving a dollar to a beggar in an orange beanie and the habitus of acting charitably in any situation in which one finds someone in need. Virtues are acquired only after hard work, attention to one's actions, and much repetition:
More than a crackerjack lecture on temperance is going to be required if you are to become temperate. You must change your heart. Only by dint of repeated acts, performed with difficulty and against the grain, will temperance become your good such that acting in accord with it in changing circumstances is merely a matter of your acting in character. (McInerny 2004, 109) Even a single act forms character in that it expresses one's will and one's acceptance of the action. 32 Since the human being is continually maturing and changing, actions leave "traces" on the human being. 33 It is neither the intellect that knows nor the will that decides, but it is the human being as acting person who recognizes, initiates, and determines. To act with efficacy is to integrate the rich complexity of the embodied human agent in a way that transforms him or her … . Action, then, redounds upon the whole person, so that self-determination is also self-formation and self-development. 34 Moral actions especially have a significant effect on the person, because they are determinative of good or bad character.
Because action draws upon the whole person as agent, it affects the whole person; and because ethical action engages the good of the person through personalistic values, it cannot leave the person indifferent to his or her action. It transforms the person, for better or for worse. 35 Self-determination is key to becoming of good moral character. Paul Taylor sees four ways in which we can train ourselves to be morally good: (1) simply doing good and avoiding evil; (2) deliberately placing ourselves in situations of moral significance (e.g., volunteering at a soup kitchen); (3) imagining ourselves in such situations and acting rightly; and (4) "reflective thinking about moral matters" (Taylor 1964, 22) .
If a physician sees use of contraception as morally bad, then acting out of his good moral character or if he wants to develop good character, he will not facilitate the use of contraception by writing prescriptions for it. It is intrinsic to the definition of a prescription that the physician is recommending and expecting that it will be filled and the medication taken by the patient, and this for the good of the health of the patient. It cannot be separated from this context.
If a physician acts against his judgment that contraception is morally bad and still writes a prescription for it, his character is affected. By his action, he actually wills that contraception be used, he wills what he considers an evil. If it becomes a habit then he may no longer even be thinking of the evil but just doing it automatically. Through repetition, it may become an inclination or habitus such that he starts recommending it (in appropriate situations) even to patients who do not ask for it. Through his actions, he also risks being associated with the category of physicians who write prescriptions for contraception thinking it morally good. For, acts are not only self-determinative of an individual but also self-determinative of a group or community (Finnis 1998, 41) . He may not recognize himself in that group but others will, simply due to the fact that one of the group's traits is that they write prescriptions for contraception (Ricoeur 1992, 121-22) . According to Aquinas, this is hypocrisy, that is, "simulat [ing] a character which is not his own" (Aquinas 1948, II-II, q. 111, a. 3) . This in fact indicates a fifth way of training one's character that we can add to Taylor's four above: associating with a group or community which embodies the character traits one wishes to acquire. 36 In such association one can seek to imitate the group's traits and character.
So far, we have seen that one's actions reflect one's character, and they also form one's character. Consequently, the morality of one's actions also reflects and forms one's character. Good moral actions come from a good character and form a good character. Bad moral actions come from and form a bad character.
BEING OF GOOD CHARACTER

The good
One of the most essential-if not the most essential-requirements of good moral action is knowledge of the good. Knowledge of the good frees us to act well, that is, to act in accordance with the good that we have come to know. "Moral behavior is a response to reality and therefore requires a knowledge of reality" (Ratzinger 1984, 10) . This knowledge is not made up by the person, nor is it found exclusively in Revelation or the Scriptures (Caffara 1987, 162) . Knowledge of the good is found in study of the world around us and in study of human beings (anthropology, biology, medicine, etc., and including philosophy and theology), in other words, in reality and in truth. 37 Everyone chooses the good (or what they believe to be the good), even someone acting immorally or breaking the law has some good in mind. 38 The thief steals a jacket, because he thinks looking cool is a good or steals money, because he thinks being able to buy things is a good. The physician who writes a prescription for contraception is choosing the good of keeping a job or a reputation or (what he or she thinks is) the good of the patient's health. But to know only an apparent good is to be hampered in choosing the good. Full(er) knowledge of the good frees us to choose the true good rather than an apparent good and therefore frees us to act in a truly moral way. 39 More concretely, choosing the good is "do[ing] those things which truly constitute our fulfillment and perfection." 40 The good is not only goods outside the person or goods for the person, it is also the very human being per se. 41 These goods are knowable to us and perfective of us:
Intelligible human goods such as bodily life itself, health, knowledge of the truth, etc., are "goods of the person" in the sense that they are goods intrinsically perfecting the person: they are "noble goods" (bona honesta), not mere "useful goods" (bona utilia), that is, merely instrumental goods extrinsic to the person. (Melina 2001, 43 note 13) For the physician, choosing the good also includes choosing the good for him or her as physician, that is, pursuing the ends medicine-the health of the patient and all that that entails. 42 The act of choosing the good is the process of selfdetermination with its roots in selfpossession and self-governance (see Wojtyla 1979, 106, 107) . In this way, we are responsible for our own character. 43 Some theologians, for example, McCormick (1968, 7-18) , have contended that if one chooses God then even mortal sin cannot cut one off from God unless one consciously chooses to turn away from God; this is known as the "fundamental option" theory.
[This theory] maintains that for a mortal sin to be committed an action must be accompanied by an option against God, or one's ultimate Good. Failing this, even actions which are knowingly and willingly committed in grave matter, such as taking life, adultery, … , may not be mortal sins in the sense of cutting the person off from the life of God and communion with Him … . External behavior according to this, is only a partial indicator of interior orientation and attitudes. (Bristow 2009, 195-96) On the contrary, our responsibility is more than for a (single) fundamental option for the good or for God, and it is more than having a good intention or choosing actions with good consequences (John Paul II 1993, nn. 67, 74, 77, 78) . The object of the action must be good, one cannot choose evil means even for a good end, and still say one is choosing the good. 44 "Freedom is not only the choice for one or another particular action; it is also, within that choice, a decision about oneself and a setting of one's own life for or against the Good, for or against the Truth" (John Paul II 1993, n. 65). The true "fundamental option" is not a single choice for the good (or for God) made at one point in one's life. It is a decision made for or against the good in each and every moral act. Therefore, even at this most basic level, to say that one is against contraception and then to write prescriptions for contraception is in fact to be for contraception because one chooses it by the act of writing the prescription. This is to choose contraception as in some way a good.
Good character and virtue
In order to be of good character, then, once one knows the good, one must also desire it. In the simple case, the physician who knows that the use of contraception specifically to avoid pregnancy is not good-whether for the patient's health or from a Christian moral perspective-yet still prescribes it, does not desire the good. This seems a rather strong statement, but when one knows that (1) contraception is only an apparent good, not a true good; and (2) one knows that evil means may not be used even for good consequences or from a good intention, then (3) to still act on the apparent good is to be obstinate, to desire the apparent good not the true good. "The original or originating practical situation calls out not only for reason but also for affectivity and desire; thus it is that the grasp of the Good depends on the dispositions of the subject." 45 The will must actually desire and incline itself to the good.
Choosing for or against the good, for or against the evil, is something that the will is constantly struggling with. It is easy to fall into evil; it is hard to continuously do good moral acts, this requires constant work. It is difficult to ascertain knowledge and establish truth. Human beings' struggle to arrive at a deeper and deeper knowledge of the demands of God's divine and eternal law can be impeded because of their own biases and passions and because of the prejudices and misconceptions common to the cultures in which they live. The heart of the problem is human sinfulness, which afflicts the whole human race and each individual personally. (May 2003, 88) Our reason can be overcome by (unreasonable) passions or mislead by false or incomplete knowledge (Aquinas 1993 (Aquinas , bk. 7, lec. 3, n. 1348 . Our conscience guides us to judging right or wrong action but that needs training and informing also. Conscience needs to know the good and to be listened to in order for us to act according to it. To listen and to act both require dispositions, desires, and tendencies ordered to the good.
Morality is therefore that ordering of desire and of will required for a good life: this ordering is not an external regulation of acts because they are in harmony with law or because they produce better results in the world; it is rather that interior harmony that reason introduces into our passions and choices precisely so that man might be himself. It is a harmony, an order that is not only a subjectivistic psychological expression but the reflection of the truth about the Good that fulfills man's desire. (Melina 2001, 45) As we saw above, Aquinas calls this habitus, that is, inclination or disposition. When speaking of moral or good character, this then is an inclination or disposition to the good, in other words, virtue. While habits diminish freedom, virtue and virtues diminish potency (Melina 2001, 54) . Potency is diminished by being put into act. Character is a potency, and when it is put into act, it becomes good character or bad character. Virtue is the act of good character, and virtues are the "principles of good action." 46 Virtues are formative of the moral life, are developed through education, and are linked to time and the incompleteness (that is, potency) of the human being (Melina 2001, 56) . One could say that virtue is habit, skill, and habitus. Virtues "forge" character. 47 They perfect the will and freedom (Caffara 1987, 166) . Consequently, they perfect the human being. "The realization of the human person is not principally in morally good actions, but in the acquisition of the moral virtues." 48 The virtues then are not just dispositions but an actualization of the human being, a changing from wanting to be of good character to actually being of good character (Von Hildebrand and Von Hildebrand 1966, 87) . The human being "acquires right evaluation regarding the principle of things to be done, that is, the end, by the habitus of virtue either natural or learned by custom." 49 This even leads one of virtuous character to act with regret when the right choice in a situation is not ideal (Anscombe 1963, 89-90) . While all human beings have a natural inclination to the good and therefore to virtue, 50 the virtues need to be trained and developed so that they become a "second nature," an actuality rather than a potency, a habitus of good character (Melina 2001, 51-53) .
The most important of the virtues is prudence: good character and moral action depend on it. 51 Prudence is right judgment in moral matters. This is not some prim conformity to convention or rule, but excellence and strength (virtus) of character involving a disposition and readiness to act with intelligent love in pursuit of real goodsthe basic human goods towards which the primary practical principles directand successful resistance to the ultimately unreasonable lure of bad options. (Finnis 1998, 84, original emphasis) As Aquinas says, quoting Augustine, "Prudence is the knowledge of what to seek and what to avoid." 52 It is the virtue "which perfects the reason [and] surpasses in goodness the other moral virtues which perfect the appetitive power" (Aquinas 1948, I-II, q. 66, a. 1) . The more prudence one has, the more one judges correctly the right action to take. At the same time, prudence depends on the other virtues: one may determine through prudence that fortitude is required in a particular situation, but if one does not have fortitude then one cannot carry out what prudence concludes is the right course of action. 53 It is prudence that ties all the other virtues together; by judging the right thing to do, it steers all the virtues to right action and the good. 54 In the case of the physician who sees contraception as immoral, it may seem prudent for him to write prescriptions for contraception, because, for instance, he has to support his family and so cannot afford to lose his position or patients. 55 But the effect on his character, changing him into someone he does not want to be-that is, a physician who wills the writing of prescriptions for contraception and therefore wills the evil of contraception-may be unwelcome and unwanted. Therefore, it may be more prudent for him to look for a different place in which to practice in which he does not feel compelled to write prescriptions for contraception.
HYPOCRISY OR INTEGRITY
What is at stake then is the integrity of the human being. As Pope John Paul II said: "To separate the fundamental option from concrete kinds of behavior means to contradict the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and in his soul." 56 In the case under discussion, to separate one's view that use of contraception is immoral from one's action of writing prescriptions for it is a contradiction of the unity of the physician as moral agent. In fact, such a separation is not really possible, because character and action interact with each other. One could say that they spontaneously tend toward assimilation and amalgamation. This is the meaning and the consequence of self-possession, selfgovernance, and self-determination.
It is in ourselves that the drama of our liberty is played out, and it is played through what we do. The human person is more than his or her liberty; but it is in action that the whole person is gathered into the task of responsible freedom. If we are to possess ourselves and to govern ourselves through our liberty, then we are faced with the task of integration-not only of coordinating the various strands of our consciousness, but of integrating into our actions our whole human being, body and soul, physis and psyche. 57
To be of good moral character, a person must have knowledge of the good, act in morally good ways, and be disposed and inclined toward the good through the virtues. The physician who believes that use of contraception is immoral must also act in ways that display that belief and avoid actions that promote contraception use by his patients. ENDNOTES 1. I will limit this paper to physicians, but similar questions arise for hospitals and for pharmacists and other healthcare personnel.
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